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INTRODUCTION 
 “Both the state and the victims of crime have an important interest in 
the timely enforcement of a sentence.” Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 
(2006). But “not all petitioners have an incentive to obtain…relief as quickly 
as possible. In particular, capital petitioners might deliberately engage in 
dilatory tactics to prolong their incarceration and avoid execution of the 
sentence of death.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277–78 (2005). Indeed, 
“capital defendants, facing impending execution, seek to avoid being 
executed. Their incentive, therefore, is to utilize every means possible to 
delay the carrying out of their sentence.” Lindh v. Murhpy, 521 U.S. 320, 340 
(1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 
-2- 
429 (1984) (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (noting “the potential for false claims and 
deliberate delay in [capital] context is obviously enormous”). For a petitioner 
sentenced to death, delay is its own reward. 
 This appeal—Troy Kell’s fourth pass through this Court—perfectly 
illustrates that well-recognized truism. One would strain to imagine more 
suitable circumstances for the imposition of a death sentence without 
misgivings for the possibility of a false conviction or about just desert: Kell, a 
white supremacist already serving life in prison without possibility of parole 
for murder, murdered fellow inmate Lonnie Blackmon merely because he 
was African-American. The murder was caught on videotape. Those facts 
have never been in dispute, and a jury sentenced him to death.  
 But twenty-six years later, Kell’s case limps along, apparently no closer 
to conclusion than it was the last time this Court considered it in 2012. Just 
when the federal court seemed ready to finally dispose of Kell’s habeas 
petition, his legal team decided it was suddenly the right time to present 
claims in state court based on juror declarations obtained fully five years 
earlier. Irrespective of the contents of those declarations, Kell obviously 
withheld and then strategically deployed them. This was not a good faith 
effort to obtain post-conviction relief on a meritorious claim. If that had been 
Kell’s goal, he would have pursued this claim with all haste.  
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 But he didn’t. He withheld the claim and the supporting evidence—for 
five years—springing them only when they would most effectively stall the 
final disposition of his federal habeas petition and execution of his 
presumptively valid death sentence.  
 The Utah Legislature, in enacting the Post-Conviction Remedies Act 
(PCRA), has fairly balanced the availability of collateral remedies available to 
reasonably diligent petitioners against the perverse incentive capital 
petitioners have to delay presentation of claims for purely dilatory purposes. 
A petitioner who discovers new evidence and timely files the claim based on 
it will always have one full and fair opportunity to press the claim and obtain 
relief where appropriate. But a petitioner like Kell—who withholds claims 
for half a decade beyond his first opportunity to present them—will be cut 
off. This is fair because if the petitioner really thought he had something that 
would get him off death row, he surely would have presented it when he first 
had the chance. The act of withholding claims speaks to Kell’s view of the 
claims’ merits and his motives in pressing them now.  
Kell obtained his juror declarations in 2012. They purport to show that 
Kell’s sentencing judge spoke ex parte with the jury during sentencing 
deliberations, though only one of the jurors purports to clearly remember 
what the judge allegedly told the jury about how to strike the balance 
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between life and death. Kell then waited until 2018 to present the declarations 
in state court. The plain terms of the PCRA doubly barred this claim because 
it came (1) many years past expiration of the statute of limitations, and (2) 
successive to multiple opportunities Kell passed up to discover and present 
it.  
The district court below recognized how plainly the PCRA bars this 
claim and correctly denied post-conviction relief on summary judgment.  
Kell makes no argument that the PCRA does not, as written, bar his 
claim. Instead, he argues multiple extra-statutory reasons why he should be 
exempted from the procedural bars. But even if such exemptions were legally 
possible, Kell manifestly deserves no consideration of them here since he 
intentionally opted out of compliance with the PCRA at least as early as 2013, 
the most generous possible deadline to file his claim. Having chosen to forgo 
that statutory remedy, Kell cannot claim unfairness in judicial refusal to 
create special remedies ex nihilo just for him. And Kell has failed to show that 
the exemptions he requests are legally available or would benefit him even if 
they were.  
And to the extent Kell purports to stand on equity, he deserves none.  
Those who seek equity must come with clean hands. Rosenthyne v. Matthews-
-5- 
McCulloch Co., 51 Utah 381, 68 P. 957, 960 (1917) (noting “the maxim that ‘he 
who seeks equity must do equity’”). Equity does not reward tactical delay. 
The district court’s judgment should be affirmed.  
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
 Did the post-conviction court correctly grant summary judgment and 
deny Kell’s petition because it was both time and procedurally barred?  
 Standard of Review. This Court reviews a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for correctness. Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62,¶8, 194 P.3d 913 
(citing Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12,¶13, 156 P.3d 739) (other citation omitted). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of relevant facts. 
 This crime’s facts are not disputed: A prison videotape captured 
avowed white supremacist Troy Kell stabbing African-American and fellow 
inmate Lonnie Blackmon sixty-seven times in the eyes, face, neck, and back, 
until he bled to death. Kell was already serving a life-without-parole sentence 
for murder when he killed Blackmon. See generally State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106, 
61 P.3d 1019 (Kell I). 
B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court. 
 A jury convicted Kell of aggravated murder and sentenced him to 
death. Id. This Court affirmed Kell’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. 
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Id. Kell filed a petition in his first-round post-conviction relief case (PCI) in 
May 2003, followed by an amended petition in August 2005. See generally 
docket, case no. 030600171. This Court affirmed denial of that petition. Kell v. 
State, 2008 UT 62, 194 P.3d 913 (Kell II).  
 In 2007, while Kell II was still pending, the federal district court 
appointed Jon Sands, the Arizona Federal Defender and Kell’s current 
counsel, to represent Kell in his anticipated federal habeas action. R726,907. 
 Kell then filed a rule 60(b) motion in the state case, the denial of which 
this Court affirmed. Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25, 285 P.3d 1133 (Kell III). This 
Court recognized the rule 60(b) motion for what it was—an attempt to avoid 
the limits on filing successive petitions. Id.  
 While the rule 60(b) proceedings unfolded, counsel sought and 
received a first stay of the federal case under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 
(2005). R726,907.   
 In January 2013, seven months after this Court affirmed denial of Kell’s 
rule 60(b) motion, Kell filed an amended federal habeas petition. R907. Kell’s 
amended petition claimed, among other things, that the trial judge provided 
a supplemental instruction during the jury’s penalty-phase deliberations, 
without notice to the parties, which Kell argued unconstitutionally shifted 
the burden of proof to the defense. R907-08. Kell attached declarations from 
-7- 
jurors that were signed in May 2012, mere days after this Court affirmed the 
denial of Kell’s rule 60(b) motion in Kell III. R908.  
 Despite presenting this claim in his January 2013 habeas petition, Kell 
took no immediate action, either in state or federal court, to get relief on that 
claim.1 See generally docket, federal case no. 02:07-cv-00359-CW. Kell waited 
another 5 years, until after the federal court heard final argument on whether 
to grant or deny the habeas petition, before asking the federal court for a 
second stay of the federal action to press the claim in state court. See id. doc. 
nos. 243,245.  
 The federal court granted Kell’s motion to stay in November 2017. R38-
49. The Tenth Circuit recently determined it did not have jurisdiction to 
review that order on appeal. See generally Kell v. Benzon, 925 F.3d 448 (10th 
Cir. 2019).  
 Kell filed a second state petition (PCII) on 16 January 2018. R1. The 
post-conviction court granted the State’s summary judgment motion, ruling 
that Kell’s supplemental instruction claim was both time and procedurally 
barred. R906-18. The State did not move for, and the district court did not 
                                              
1 As explained below, presentation of this claim in Kell’s federal 
petition did not permit the federal court to consider it, and Kell did not 
accompany that claim with a request to pursue it in state court.  
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consider, summary judgment on an alternative merits basis. R750 (State’s 
motion to stay briefing on merits response pending summary judgment on 
procedural defenses); R789 (order granting motion to stay merits response).  
 Kell timely appealed. R919. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Kell argues that the trial judge unconstitutionally shifted the burden of 
proof at sentencing from the State to the defense during an ex parte meeting 
with the jury. He supports this argument with declarations from jurors that 
his current counsel obtained in 2012.  
 But the merits of Kell’s claim are not before this Court. The lower court 
granted summary judgment on purely procedural grounds. Kell waited 
many years—a minimum of five—after the statute of limitations expired 
before bringing the claim to state court. And Kell could have but did not bring 
the claim in his PCI proceedings. The district court correctly ruled that those 
procedural grounds barred Kell’s claim. 
 Kell does not argue that the PCRA as written does not bar his claim. 
Instead, he floats a number of reasons why he thinks the current PCRA 
should not apply to his claim. But this Court need not consider any of Kell’s 
proffered alternatives. Kell effectively opted out of the statutory cause of 
action the PCRA provided him. He tactically withheld his claim for many 
-9- 
years, bringing it out not when it would most likely get merits review, but 
when it would most effectively delay his federal habeas proceedings. With 
juror declarations in hand in 2012, Kell neglected this claim for more than five 
years. Kell got the delay in the federal court that he wanted, but that decision 
came with the consequence of forfeiting merits review of the claim in state 
court. He now asks this Court to craft an exception to the PCRA’s “limitations 
bar,” Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46,¶60, 234 P.3d 1115, to excuse his calculated 
delay in filing his state post-conviction petition. This Court should not 
reward Kell’s dilatory tactics with a merits review despite his lack of 
compliance with the PCRA’s filing requirements. See Winward v. State, 2012 
UT 85, ¶ 17, 293 P.3d 259 (articulating, but not applying, “a framework for 
considering a petitioner’s claim that he qualifies for an exception to the 
PCRA’s procedural bars”). 
 Despite his decision to forgo the cause of action the PCRA gave him no 
later than 2013, Kell claims entitlement to the benefit of the right to counsel 
the pre-2008 version of the PCRA gave him. Relying on this Court’s opinion 
in Menzies v. Galetka, Kell argues that the PCRA cannot bar his claim because, 
according to him, his PCI counsel ineffectively defaulted the claim. This 
argument (1) misconstrues the remedy available under Menzies, which is to 
set aside a total default of post-conviction proceedings under rule 60(b); (2) 
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ignores that this Court has already ruled that Kell’s PCI counsel did not fall 
to the level of the Menzies total default rule; and (3) ignores that it was current 
counsel, not PCI counsel, who discovered, delayed, and defaulted the claim 
many years after PCI counsel’s representation concluded. Simply put, the 
Arizona Federal Defender tactically withheld the claim; PCI counsel had 
nothing to do with it.  
 Kell suggests that the Court can apply an “egregious injustice” 
exception to excuse the procedural bars, but he fails to meet the criteria this 
Court has established for consideration of such a claim. First, he cannot 
establish a “reasonable justification” for his tactical delay—intentionally 
withholding the claim is the very definition of unreasonable delay. And he 
failed to brief the particulars of an “egregious injustice” exception or tie his 
proposed rule to any constitutional authority the Court has for creating one. 
Kell has failed to show entitlement to consideration of an “egregious 
injustice” exception. 
 Finally, Kell argues that the PCRA is unconstitutional and the Court 
should revert to its common law framework for reviewing collateral 
challenges to criminal judgments. Kell’s anemic constitutional briefing merits 
no consideration at all. But even if it did, and even if Kell could show the 
PCRA runs afoul of the judiciary’s inherent constitutional powers—which 
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the State does not concede—reverting to the common law would not help 
him. Under this Court’s pre-PCRA case law, Kell would have the burden to 
show that he did not tactically withhold the claim he now wants the Court to 
review. He has not even attempted to shoulder that burden in his opening 
brief, and “that alone is a fatal misstep.” Pinder v. State, 2015 UT 56,¶58, 367 
P.3d 968. Nor could he ever shoulder it. Kell plainly withheld the claim for 
tactical reasons. Because any constitutional ruling in Kell’s favor could never 
support relief, such a ruling would be merely advisory and principles of 
constitutional avoidance counsel against addressing the argument. 
 The Court should affirm the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment.  
ARGUMENT 
Kell’s claim is both time and procedurally barred 
because he withheld it for many years before 
presenting it to the district court. 
 Kell’s dilatory tactics are unmistakable. Kell relies on declarations to 
support his claim that his capital sentencing trial was tainted. He obtained 
those declarations in 2012. Under the plain terms of the PCRA, he could have 
presented those declarations in a post-conviction petition within one year of 
when reasonable diligence would have led him to them. Had he done so, he 
would have received merits review.  
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 But he didn’t. He allowed the statute of limitations to lapse many times 
over, filing the claim in state court nearly 6 years after he actually had the 
declarations he relies on to support it. Rather than timely attempt to get relief 
by presenting the declarations in state court under a statute that expressly 
gave him a cause of action—see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(1)(c) (permitting 
cause of action where “the sentence was imposed…in violation of the 
controlling statutory provisions”) and id. § 78B-9-107(2)(e) (delaying accrual 
of cause of action and start of statute of limitations until “the date on which 
petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based”)—Kell instead 
merely noted the declarations in a habeas petition to a court that, under 
federal law, could not even consider them. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(A) 
(prohibiting federal habeas relief unless petitioner first exhausts claim in 
State court); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (“We now hold that 
[habeas] review…is limited to the record that was before the state court that 
adjudicated the claim on the merits.”). Only when the federal court was 
poised to end Kell’s habeas action—five years after he obtained the 
declarations and nearly four years after he noted them in his amended federal 
petition—did he finally decide the time was right to seek relief in state court.  
-13- 
 The plain terms of the PCRA bar this claim, both because Kell waited 
more than a year after discovering the evidence on which it was based and 
because he failed to show that he could not with reasonable diligence have 
discovered and presented the claim during his first-round post-conviction 
review. And while Kell faults prior counsel for defaulting the claim, his brief 
conspicuously omits discussion of either his current counsel’s five-year 
neglect of the claim after obtaining the declarations or the five years before 
that when current counsel could have investigated the claim but didn’t. Kell’s 
transparent tactical default undermines any argument he could make about 
prior counsel’s omissions and, therefore, any excuse he seeks from the PCRA 
procedural bars. In any event, this Court has already recognized the abolition 
of extra-statutory excuses in general and the unavailability to Kell specifically 
of now-defunct extra-statutory excuses.  
 A.  The lower court correctly granted summary 
judgment because Kell’s claim is statutorily barred.  
 A court must grant summary judgment “if the pleadings” and other 
evidence show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(a). Summary judgment serves a “salutary purpose in our procedure 
because it eliminates the time, trouble and expense of” an evidentiary hearing 
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“when upon the best showing the plaintiff can make, he would not be entitled 
to a judgment.” Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 353 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah 1960).   
 Once the State raises the time and procedural bars, a petitioner must 
disprove their application by a preponderance of the evidence. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-9-105(2). And a petitioner must also proffer admissible evidence 
on each element he must prove to get relief. Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 
73,¶43, 267 P.3d 232. 
 For the reasons argued below, Kell’s pleaded facts and proffered 
evidence—presumptively his “best showing”—were insufficient as a matter 
of law to demonstrate that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Kell’s claim 
is time barred because he waited more than a year after the latest possible 
date that his cause of action accrued. And it is procedurally barred because 
he could have raised it in his first post-conviction proceeding but did not. 
Kell failed to proffer facts that, if proved and believed, would entitle him to 
-15- 
relief. The district court was therefore required to grant summary judgment 
against him.2   
1.   Kell’s claim is time barred because he filed his 
current petition more than one year after he knew 
the evidentiary facts on which it is based. 
 The PCRA provides that a person “is not eligible” for post-conviction 
relief on “any ground that…is barred by the limitation period.” Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-9-106(1)(e). It bars relief for claims filed more than one year after 
a cause of action accrues. Id. § 78B-9-107(1).   
 The PCRA provides a flexible framework for determining when a post-
conviction “cause of action accrues,” which happens “on the latest of” several 
possible dates. Id. § 78B-9-107(2). Those dates include, most generously, “the 
date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of 
                                              
2 Kell’s Point I argues that he is entitled to post-conviction relief 
because the trial judge violated Kell’s constitutional rights by allegedly 
giving the sentencing jury ex parte supplemental instructions. Br.Aplt. 12-17. 
But that claim is not before this Court. The district court stayed consideration 
of the merits of Kell’s claim, denied the petition on purely procedural 
grounds, and never reached the merits even as an alternative basis for 
summary judgment. R789,906-18. Indeed, the State never asked the district 
court to rule that there was no genuine fact dispute on the merits of Kell’s 
claim and, were this Court to reverse summary judgment, might not do so on 
remand. In other words, if this Court reverses summary judgment on the 
procedural bars, it is in no position to review whether a fact dispute exists on 
the merits of Kell’s claim.  
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reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based.” Id. 
§ 78B-9-107(2)(e). The statute allows no exceptions to the time bar. 
 Kell filed his amended federal habeas petition in January 2013. He 
identified the current supplemental jury instruction claim and supported it 
with the same evidence he relies on here. Compare R51-57 with R738-49 
(federal case no. 2:07-cv-00359-CW, doc. no. 94 Exhs. 1-5) (Addendum C). 
That evidence consisted entirely of declarations signed in May 2012. He 
therefore unquestionably “knew…of evidentiary facts on which the petition 
is based” nearly six years before filing his state petition. Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-9-107(2)(e). Under the most generous application of the statute, Kell had 
until May 2013—one year after obtaining the juror declarations—to file his 
petition. He chose instead to wait until January 2018, at least four and a half 
years too late.  
 Kell argues at length that his PCI counsel performed deficiently by not 
asserting the supplemental-instruction claim in his first post-conviction 
petition. Br.Aplt. 19–23. But PCI counsel’s involvement is entirely beside the 
point since their involvement in the case ended many years earlier. Current 
counsel discovered the claim at least as early as 2012. Armed as Kell therefore 
was with the knowledge of this potential PCI ineffective-assistance claim in 
2012, he waited and allowed that claim to sit idle. Because Kell 
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unquestionably knew of his supplemental-instruction claim no later than 
when he obtained the juror declarations and did not file his petition within 
one year of that date, the PCRA statute of limitations bars consideration of its 
merits or granting relief. The signing of the declarations stands as a firm 
boundary to measure accrual of his causes of action; it also allows the most 
generous possible view of the limitation period despite Kell’s neglect of his 
reasonable diligence burden. That is, even disregarding whether Kell should 
have known the facts earlier, the signing of the declarations concretely 
demonstrates Kell’s neglect of his actual knowledge of the evidence. Faulting 
PCI counsel does not excuse current counsel’s neglect of the claim.  
 Rather than confront this basis for the district court’s decision, Kell 
simply speculates that had he “filed a petition including this claim in 2013, 
the court almost certainly would have found that it had already been 
defaulted” in 2005 when the PCI judgment was entered. Br.Aplt. 25. In other 
words, he asserts an earlier and less generous 2005 accrual date—arguing as 
if accrual dates had something to do with the procedural bar—asserts a 
statutory right to post-conviction counsel at that time, supposes that he had 
filed a post-conviction petition in 2013 when he had juror declarations in 
hand, presumes an unfavorable court default ruling based on a presumed 
earlier accrual date, and argues that PCI counsel was ineffective for not 
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raising the supplemental-instruction claim in the 2005 collateral challenge. 
Br.Aplt. 24–26. Accordingly, he asks this Court for relief while turning a blind 
eye to his own decision to withhold the claim from presentation and 
adjudication once he unquestionably discovered it. 
 The lower court correctly granted summary judgment denying Kell’s 
claim as time barred.    
2. The PCRA bars Kell’s claim because he could have 
raised it in his previous post-conviction petition 
but did not. 
 The PCRA bars relief for “any ground…that could have been, but was 
not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief.” Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-9-106(1)(d). This procedural bar has no exceptions. This section 
independently bars Kell’s claim because, although he had not yet obtained 
the juror declarations during PCI review, he proffered no evidence that, if 
proved and believed, would have adequately explained why he could not 
have done so in time to discover and raise this claim the first time around. 
 Certainly, the PCRA does not bar a claim that a petitioner could not 
have presented earlier because, for example, the State withheld the evidence 
in violation of the constitution or the information was unobtainable. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1)(d) (barring only those claims that “could have 
been” raised in a prior petition). To meet his burden to show by a 
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preponderance of the evidence that his claim is not barred, see id. § 78B-9-
105(2), Kell therefore had to show how and when he discovered the juror 
information and demonstrate that he could not with reasonable diligence 
have discovered and presented it in his first state petition. Kell proffered no 
evidence to shoulder this burden. 
 Nor could he. The jurors’ descriptions of their alleged interactions with 
the trial judge would presumably have been the same—if not clearer and 
more complete—immediately after trial and during the many years Kell 
waited until asking jurors for declarations. Kell has not said that the jurors 
refused until 2012 to discuss the case or that they only lately remembered the 
information. The most reasonable inference is to the contrary—the jurors 
freely gave the information and signed affidavits in 2012. With reasonable 
diligence Kell could have discovered and brought this claim in a motion for 
new trial, during PCI proceedings, or during the rule 60(b) proceedings. Kell 
concedes that the claim could and should have been presented earlier by 
faulting previous counsel for not doing so.3  
 The PCRA bars Kell’s claim and the lower court correctly granted 
summary judgment.  
                                              
3 The State addresses Kell’s arguments about prior counsel in the next 
subpoint.  
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B. Kell claims entitlement to extra-statutory excuses from 
the procedural bars but fails to justify examining them 
since they would not benefit him in any event.  
 Kell’s argument does not make any argument that the statute as 
written does not bar his claim. Thus, he does not dispute that his claim falls 
afoul of the plain terms of the current PCRA’s statute of limitations and the 
procedural bar against claims that could have been raised in a previous 
petition. Instead, he argues various reasons why he thinks he is entitled to 
now-defunct statutory and common law provisions. But Kell opted out of the 
statute that gave him a remedy. He elected to forgo the proper tool at the 
proper time to raise his juror-interference claim. He cannot now be heard to 
complain about the operation of the PCRA and certainly cannot meaningfully 
argue for the benefit of something outside it when it offered an avenue for 
relief that he forfeited by his own dilatoriness. Further, none of the extra-
statutory remedies Kell argues for apply here or would benefit Kell if they 
did.  
1. Kell cannot invoke extra-statutory remedies since 
he strategically opted out of the statutory remedy 
the PCRA provided.  
 As an initial matter, Kell cannot complain about operation of the 
statutory bars or ask this Court to craft judicial exemptions from them 
because the PCRA gave Kell a cause of action with reasonable limitations. 
-21- 
And had he complied with those reasonable limitations, his claim would not 
have been procedurally barred. It was his choice that inflicted on him the very 
injury he asks this Court to relieve him from. 
 Had Kell filed his petition in 2012 when he first obtained the juror 
declarations, or rather within a year of when he reasonably could have 
obtained them, the PCRA permitted a cause of action unrestricted by 
procedural limitations. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(1)(c) (permitting 
cause of action where “the sentence was imposed…in violation of the 
controlling statutory provisions); id. § 78B-9-107(2)(e) (delaying accrual of 
cause of action and start of statute of limitations until “the date on which 
petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based”). Had Kell 
exercised reasonable diligence, he could have gotten a ruling on the merits of 
his claim. 
 Kell made a tactical decision not to use the claim in a timely effort to 
obtain post-conviction relief. Instead, he bided his time and reserved the 
claim until filing it provided optimal potential to stall final judgment in his 
federal habeas case. He got the delay he sought—a nearly two year and 
counting intermission since the federal court heard argument but did not rule 
on Kell’s habeas petition pending the outcome of this litigation. But Kell’s 
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tactical decision came with a trade-off: to get the maximum delay Kell had to 
opt out of procedural compliance with the PCRA. Filing a timely petition in 
2012 or 2013 would not have stalled final judgment on his federal petition—
state court litigation could have been fully resolved before the 2017 argument 
in federal court.  
 By choosing maximum delay rather than procedural compliance, Kell 
opted out of the statutory remedy he may have had available to him. His own 
decisions, not the PCRA, prevented Kell from obtaining merits review of his 
claim. Indeed, nothing outside of Kell’s control prevented him from initiating 
a state post-conviction petition in 2012. He had the reasonable opportunity 
then to have his juror-interference claim heard and determined. Kell has 
never argued that he could not file a procedurally compliant petition. Had he 
applied for post-conviction relief at his first opportunity to do so, he would 
have received merits review of his claim. He simply chose not to, and his 
choice should not be rewarded here with a judicial exemption from the 
consequences of that decision.  
2. Ineffective assistance by PCI counsel does not 
excuse either the time bar or the procedural bar on 
Kell’s claim. 
 Kell argues that a right to effective post-conviction counsel—read into 
the PCRA by a 2006 opinion from this Court, Menzies v. Galetka—applies to 
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him and its violation by PCI counsel excuses both procedural failures. 
Br.Aplt. 17-18 (citing 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480).4 
 In Menzies, this Court read a statutory right to funded counsel in death-
penalty post-conviction cases to include a right to the effective assistance of 
counsel. 2006 UT 81,¶¶79-84. In response, the Legislature amended the 
statute to provide, “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as creating the 
right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, and relief may not 
                                              
4 In arguing that PCI counsel was ineffective, Kell relies on his own 
conclusion that his juror-interference claim “was defaulted in 2005, not in 
2013, as the district court found.” Br.Aplt. 25. This assertion is born out of 
speculation. Id. (“Had Mr. Kell filed a petition including this claim in 2013, 
the court almost certainly would have found that it had already been 
defaulted.”). In any event, his assertion of trial court error runs against his 
own interests: both the post-conviction court and the State were willing to 
entertain a later and more generous date triggering the PCRA’s statute of 
limitations. Kell’s selection of the earlier and less-generous default date is 
important only because during that earlier PCI window he argues that he was 
entitled to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Id. Kell’s argument 
thus attempts to shift blame for the default from his current counsel, who is 
solely responsible for the litigation decisions that allowed the statute of 
limitations to run, to prior counsel, who never knew about the claim. But this 
framework, if followed by the Court, could only logically excuse the 
procedural bar resulting from PCI counsel’s default. It could not excuse the 
time bar resulting from current counsel’s delay in presenting the claim. Kell 
has offered no argument that could simultaneously avoid both bars.  
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be granted on any claim that post-conviction counsel was ineffective.” Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-9-202(4) (West 2008).5 
 To qualify for Menzies relief even if this were a procedurally 
appropriate invocation of it, Kell would have to show that post-conviction 
“counsel effectively ‘defaulted’” his “‘entire post-conviction proceeding, 
resulting in the dismissal’” of Kell’s post-conviction case. Archuleta v. Galetka, 
2011 UT 73,¶167, 267 P.3d 232 (quoting Menzies, 2006 UT 81,¶24). And 
Menzies held that, under the previous version of the PCRA, a post-conviction 
judgment could be set aside under rule 60(b). See id. ¶¶158-69 (explaining 
application rule of 60(b) to allow post-judgment relief from judgment in 
“‘unusual and exceptional circumstances’”) (quoting Menzies, 2006 UT 
81,¶71).  
 Menzies did not excuse a time or procedural default on a mere 
Strickland showing. Rather, this Court granted Menzies relief because his 
“counsel effectively ‘defaulted’” his “‘entire post-conviction proceeding, 
resulting in the dismissal.’” Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73,¶167, 267 P.3d 
                                              
5 Kell says it “was undisputed in the court below that Mr. Kell’s post-
conviction counsel provided ineffective assistance.” Br.Aplt. 19. This is true 
enough as far as it goes since the State did not formally dispute the 
effectiveness of PCI counsel. But that was because PCI counsel’s effectiveness 
is legally irrelevant to the default inquiry. The State did not concede nor did 
the court find that PCI counsel were ineffective.  
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232 (quoting Menzies, 2006 UT 81,¶24). Archuleta made plain that that is the 
very limited universe of Menzies relief—it is available only when counsel’s 
representation “amount[ed] to willful and deliberate inaction, complete 
forfeiture of the entire post conviction proceeding, or gross negligence.” 
Archuleta, 2011 UT 73,¶166 n14 (cleaned up). As limited, a mere Strickland 
showing is not enough for relief under Menzies. Kell would have to show that 
PCI counsel completely defaulted his case. And he would have to make that 
showing in a rule 60(b) motion filed in the original post-conviction case.  See 
id. ¶¶158-69 (explaining application rule of 60(b) to allow post-judgment 
relief from judgment in “‘unusual and exceptional circumstances’”) (quoting 
Menzies, 2006 UT 81,¶71).6 
 But Kell has already pressed—and lost—a rule 60(b) challenge to post-
conviction counsel’s representation. See generally Kell III, 2012 UT 25. This 
Court rejected Kell’s claim that his PCI counsel’s representation justified 
Menzies relief because Kell’s post-conviction “judgment…had been heard, 
ruled on, and appealed.” Id. ¶20. Thus, Kell’s post-conviction case had not 
                                              
6 It is no surprise that Kell wants this Court to decide his case under 
Strickland standards, Br.Aplt. 20, since tying the procedural bar to federal law 
might undo the state procedural bar in federal court and undermine the 
finality of this Court’s default findings there. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 
U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).  
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been defaulted, and the “generous language of Menzies directed at default 
judgments” did not apply. Id. Whatever Kell might say about the continued 
applicability of Menzies to his PCI petition, this Court already ruled that his 
PCI counsel did not default his post-conviction proceedings, and that 
determination is res judicata. Kell is thus mistaken when he says not giving 
him relief now will leave him “without any avenue to enforce [his] right” to 
counsel under the prior PCRA. Br.Aplt. 24. He had a right to be sure, but that 
right was not violated as this Court already concluded, and he never had a 
right to repeated attempts to set aside the PCI judgment on an ineffective-
assistance claim he previously lost. 
 Apparently recognizing that this Court’s determination in Kell III 
would bar relief under rule 60(b), Kell instead argues that Menzies did not 
limit the relief available in that case to rule 60(b) motions or total default. 
Br.Aplt. 23-24. Kell argues that Menzies relief could come from some other 
procedural invocation of it, but he neither offers authority in support nor 
identifies what procedural lever other than rule 60(b) could properly invoke 
Menzies relief from the PCI judgment.  
 In fact, this Court has “essentially limited Menzies to its facts” and now 
allows relief from a post-conviction judgment only in case “of a complete 
default” by counsel. Honie v. State, 2014 UT 19,¶91-92, 342 P.3d 182 (citing 
-27- 
Archuleta and Kell III). This remedy sounds in rule 60(b) and no other 
procedural mechanism. Thus, rule 60(b)’s applicability in unusual 
circumstances to relieve a post-conviction petitioner’s complete default of the 
proceedings comprises the limit of Menzies’s remedy.  
 And this Court held in Kell III that rule 60(b), including an invocation 
of Menzies, may not be used as an end-run around the PCRA’s bar against 
successive petitions. Kell III, 2012 UT 25,¶28 (holding “when a 60(b) motion 
acts as a substitute for a prohibited postconviction petition, we cannot allow 
its use”); id. ¶31 (holding “Mr. Kell’s entire 60(b) motion is barred by the 
PCRA’s prohibition against subsequent postconviction petitions, we 
conclude that it may not be brought under rule 60(b)”). If Mr. Kell could not 
successfully evade the PCRA’s procedural bars by invoking rule 60(b), he 
certainly cannot evade the PCRA’s procedural bars by filing a successive 
petition under the PCRA itself as he did here. The PCRA provides no grounds 
to set aside a PCI judgment, since its grounds for relief speak only to 
unconstitutionally-obtained convictions and sentences. Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-9-104. The PCRA does not provide collateral relief from judgments on 
collateral challenges. 
 Since Kell has identified no procedural mechanism for invoking 
Menzies other than the PCRA or his already litigated-and-lost rule 60(b) 
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motion, he has not justified his reliance on the statutory right to counsel 
identified in Menzies. 
 And even if Menzies could excuse the time bar—which the State does 
not concede, since Menzies was about defaults—Kell has not shown that it 
would excuse it forever. Menzies could only conceivably excuse PCI counsel’s 
defaults, not Kell’s and current counsel’s later delay in filing the petition that 
allowed the statute of limitations to expire from a later accrual date. Any 
impediment to filing the supplemental-instruction claim that PCI counsel’s 
representation may have posed ended in 2008 when the Court affirmed the 
denial of Kell’s first post-conviction petition and PCI counsel’s representation 
ended. That was 4 ½ years before Kell raised his supplemental-instruction 
claim for the first time in federal court and 9 ½ years before he filed it in the 
post-conviction court below. Kell’s brief does not even attempt to explain this 
delay. Federal counsel could have exercised the reasonable diligence they 
claim their immediate predecessor lacked by discovering and raising the 
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supplemental-instruction claim in state court at any time after their 2009 
appointment.7 
 As shown, they did not. And many jurists have found that his current 
counsel, the Arizona Federal Defender, intentionally delayed presentation of 
claims in capital cases, just as he they here. See, e.g., Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598 
(9th Cir. 2012) (noting capital habeas petitioner, represented by Arizona 
federal defender, “has delayed for 25 years disclosing much of the 
information on which he now premises his pretrial IAC claim”); Beaty v. 
Schriro, 554 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2009) (Arizona federal defender delaying 
presentation of Atkins claim until eve of execution, thus “engaging in 
needless piecemeal litigation, or collateral proceedings whose only purpose 
is to vex, harass, or delay”) (cleaned up); Menzies v. Benzon, 2:03-cv-00902 (D. 
Utah), doc. no. 148 at 7 (finding Arizona federal defenders withheld claim for 
years and denying Rhines motion as “dilatory”); Lafferty v. Crowther, 2015 WL 
6875393, *6 (D. Utah, October 30, 2015) (denying capital habeas petitioner a 
Rhines stay of federal proceedings, noting Arizona federal defender’s 
                                              
7 Kell argued below reasons why his current counsel could not file the 
state petition sooner, including federal regulations requiring federal court 
approval before federal counsel may be paid to pursue state remedies. See, 
e.g., R821. Kell’s brief noted but did not repeat this argument, Br.Aplt. 25 n2, 
and the State therefore does not address it. Kell may not raise the argument 
in his reply brief. State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60,¶¶20-21, 6 P.3d 1116.  
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“intentional decision to delay the case”); Garcia v. Jones, 2018 WL 6266918 at 
*2 (S.D. Tex. 30 November 2018) (finding capital petitioner, represented by 
Arizona federal defender, was “dilatory” in seeking stay so as to delay 
execution); West v. Brewer, 2011 WL 2836754 at *8 (D. Ariz. 18 July 2011) 
(finding capital petitioner, represented by Arizona federal defender, 
“unnecessarily delayed filing suit until…just three days before his scheduled 
execution” and denying stay); Murray v. Schriro, 2008 WL 1701404 at *56 n25 
(D. Ariz. 10 April 2008) (finding “[i]t was not reasonable” for capital habeas 
petitioner, represented by Arizona federal defender, “to delay his attempt to 
develop the factual bases of these claims in state court until two years after 
filing his federal habeas petition”).8 
 Kell argues that Menzies gave him a “substantive right” to effective 
post-conviction counsel that later amendments could not retroactively 
extinguish. Br.Aplt. 10. His argument is incorrect. The present version of the 
PCRA governs Kell’s present petition, not the version in effect at the time of 
prior counsel’s representation. See, e.g., Pinder v. State, 2015 UT 56,¶¶56-57, 
367 P.3d 968 (applying version of PCRA in effect on the day petition was 
                                              
8 Kell’s counsel deployed identical dilatory tactics in another Utah 
capital case, Archuleta v. State, 20160419-SC, which is currently pending 
before this Court.  
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filed). The current statute prohibits using “any claim that postconviction 
counsel was ineffective” to either “creat[e] the right to the effective assistance 
of postconviction counsel” or grant relief. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-202(4).  
 Under controlling retroactivity law, amended section 202(4) governs 
Kell’s successive petition filed in 2018. The courts “apply the law as it exists 
at the time of the event regulated by the law in question.” State v. Clark, 2011 
UT 23,¶13, 251 P.3d 829. So, for example, when a tort or breach of contract 
are at issue, the law regulating torts or breaches of contract in effect at the 
time of the tort or breach apply. If a law regulates matters such as filing a 
motion or an appeal, the law in effect at the time the motion or appeal is filed 
governs. Id. “When it comes to the parties’ procedural rights and 
responsibilities…the relevant occurrence for such purposes is the underlying 
procedural act (e.g., filing a motion or seeking an appeal).” Id. ¶14 (italics in 
original). In that case, the governing law is “the law in effect at the time of the 
procedural act, not the law in place at the time of the occurrence giving rise 
to the parties’ substantive claims.” Id. 
 In Clark, the amended statute at issue did not permit the appellant to 
appeal, even though the unamended statute did. But because no right to 
appeal existed outside of the statutory right, the amended statute in effect 
when appellants filed their appeal applied. And because it did not permit an 
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appeal, the appeal they filed could not proceed. This was true even though 
the unamended statute, which permitted an appeal, was in effect at the time 
the conduct at issue in the appeal occurred. Id. ¶¶10-11,15. 
 Under Clark, the 2008 PCRA amendment repudiating Menzies applies 
to this 2018 case, and Kell cannot rely on PCI counsel’s alleged ineffective 
assistance to escape time and procedural bars. Menzies did not create a right 
to substantive relief for PCI counsel’s ineffective assistance. The right Menzies 
read into the statute could only permit bypassing a procedural impediment 
to considering the merits of a separate claim that may justify post-conviction 
relief. It could not get Menzies substantive relief from his conviction. As such, 
the right was procedural rather than substantive, contrary to Kell’s 
interpretation. 
 Kell relies on Menzies only to excuse procedural defects in his 2018 
action. The event the Menzies rule would address is the State’s procedural 
defenses to Kell’s 2018 post-conviction case. Until the State raised those 
procedural defenses in its summary judgment motion in 2018, the event that 
gave rise to Kell’s post-conviction ineffective-assistance response to the 
procedural defenses had yet to arise. Therefore, as in Clark, the 2008 law in 
effect when that event occurred in 2018, including the amendments doing 
away with Menzies, governs this case.  
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 In any event, this Court has never held, in Menzies or anywhere else, 
that a showing of mere ineffective assistance of PCI counsel would justify 
bringing otherwise defaulted claims in later petitions.  
 Under controlling law, Kell is thus precluded from overcoming the 
time and procedural bars by alleging ineffective assistance of his PCI team. 
3. Kell cannot rely on judicial exceptions that the 
PCRA abolished and that would not qualify him for 
relief in any event. 
 Kell argues alternatively that he is entitled to merits review “under the 
judicial exceptions to the PCRA.” Br.Aplt. 26. Relying on this Court’s pre-
2008 pronouncements, Kell argues that the Court’s traditional common law 
habeas doctrines “retain their independent constitutional significance.” Id. 27 
(citing Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56,¶22; Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42,¶14, 94 
P.3d 263; Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1989)) (quotation marks 
omitted). And he asserts that he is entitled to by-pass his defaults under an 
“egregious injustice” exception. 
The PCRA and rule 65C abolished the common law exceptions. And 
by virtue of his tactical delay, Kell would not qualify for relief under them or 
under an egregious injustice exception. 
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a. Kell does not qualify for consideration of an 
“egregious injustice” exception because his 
tactical default has no “reasonable 
justification.”  
 First, Kell argues that his claim qualifies for merits review outside the 
PCRA’s limitations by virtue of an “egregious injustice” framework 
suggested in Winward v. State, 2012 UT 85, 293 P.3d 259. Br.Aplt. 27-32. In 
Winward, this Court discussed in dicta what analysis it would consider 
sufficient to establish the existence of an egregious injustice exception to the 
PCRA’s procedural bars. But no opinion from this Court has ever confirmed 
the existence of an egregious injustice exception.9  
 And Kell cannot even pass over the threshold to get consideration of 
whether there is an “egregious injustice exception”—that he had “a 
reasonable justification for missing the deadline.” Winward, 2012 UT 85,¶18.  
As shown, the record irrefutably shows that he actually knew the facts 
supporting his supplemental-instruction claim as early as 2012, yet he did not 
seek state post-conviction review of the claim until 2018. And as shown, that 
                                              
9 In fact, the State has asked this Court to disavow its dicta in Winward 
in two currently-pending cases. See Br.Aple., Archuleta v. State, 20160419-SC; 
Br.Aple., Patterson v. State, 20180108-SC. Both parties’ briefs in both of those 
cases provided the Court more substantive briefing and more appropriate 
occasions to address Winward. To the extent the Court might have interest in 
examining the Winward question in this case, the State invites the Court 
instead to address the issue only after deciding Archuleta and/or Patterson 
given the paucity of briefing on Winward in Kell’s brief. 
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delay was tactical—Kell timed initiating this action to maximize delay in his 
federal habeas action. 
Kell entirely ignores this lengthy delay and instead merely faults PCI 
counsel’s omission of the claim. But these 5 ½ years had just as much or more 
relevance to Winward’s “reasonable justification” consideration as the period 
during which PCI counsel represented Kell. Even under his own argument, 
Kell would have to establish that both PCI counsel and the Arizona Federal 
Defender provided ineffective assistance by defaulting the claim during rule 
60(b) proceedings and for allowing the statute of limitations to expire after 
obtaining the juror declarations. Kell makes no such argument, and any 
“reasonable justification” Kell could squeeze out of PCI counsel’s 
performance evaporated once current counsel took over and continued to 
withhold the claim. As shown, the only “justification” was tactical delay.  
That is not reasonable.10  
                                              
10 Kell also omits discussion of the period between his conviction and 
sentence in 1996 and the conclusion of his direct appeal in 2002. Kell does not 
dispute that he could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the 
evidence supporting his supplemental-instruction claim as soon as the jury 
sentenced him, and raised it at any time during this period. Winward’s 
framework would require yet more “reasonable justification” covering the 
pre-PCI delay that Kell leaves unaddressed.  
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 Because Kell has offered no justification, reasonable or otherwise, for 
current counsel’s tactical default of the claim, the Court need not address the 
claim’s alleged merit under the second part of the Winward threshold. See 
Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62,¶16, 123 P.3d 400 (acknowledging that a total 
failure on one prong obviates need to address the other). Were the Court to 
wade into merits review, even under the Winward framework, that analysis 
would necessarily build in substantial delay in this almost 30-year-old case 
and undermine the finality of this Court’s judgment. Entangling default 
questions with federal law permits the federal court to disregard this Court’s 
default decision in habeas review. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41. If the Court 
nevertheless comments on the merits of the claim under federal law, it should 
make clear whether Kell’s lack of justification for his tactical default 
adequately supports the default independently of the claim’s potential merit 
or lack thereof. See id. at 1038 n4 (“[W]e have long recognized that where the 
judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and 
the other non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal 
ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the 
judgment.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
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b.  Kell also has not “briefed the particulars” of the 
Court’s constitutional authority to apply an 
“egregious injustice” exception.  
 After a petitioner successfully gets past Winward’s threshold, step two 
of that inquiry obliges the petitioner to “fully brief the particulars of this 
exception,” including “an articulation of the exception itself, its parameters, 
and the basis for this court’s constitutional authority for recognizing such an 
exception.” Winward, 2012 UT 85,¶18. Kell has done none of that. He has 
merely suggested that the Court “could define an exception that mirrors the 
cause and prejudice exception to procedural default as articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), and Martinez v. 
Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012).” Br.Aplt. 11. But he has neither briefed the particulars 
of that exception—which is much more complicated than his brief 
acknowledges and, as explained below, has no application to Utah procedure 
in any event—nor tied the Martinez exception to any recognized 
constitutional authority this Court possesses. 
 In Martinez, the Supreme Court held that “[i]nadequate assistance of 
counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a 
prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” 
Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9. This rule applies only when state law compels a federal 
habeas petitioner to postpone his trial ineffective assistance claims until his 
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“initial-review collateral proceeding.” Id. at 13. And the rule stemmed from a 
well-recognized equitable power federal courts have to “excuse the prisoner 
from the usual sanction of default” where they could show cause for and 
prejudice from the default. Id. 
 Even if this Court had discretion to exercise extra-statutory powers—
which the State does not concede—Kell has not justified using that discretion 
to create a Martinez-like exception because (1) it applies only to claims of trial 
counsel ineffectiveness, not claims of trial court error like the one Kell raises 
here, and (2) Martinez is unique to the demands of federal habeas procedure 
and can do no work in Utah. 
 First, even if Martinez could apply in Utah state courts, it could not 
apply to Kell’s claim. The Supreme Court has recently clarified that the 
Martinez exception is limited to excusing the default of only trial ineffective-
assistance claims. Davila v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 2058, 2068 (2017) (holding that 
Martinez responded “to an equitable consideration that is unique to claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel and accordingly inapplicable to claims 
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel” and other non-trial-ineffective-
assistance claims). Kell’s supplemental-instruction claim is not a trial 
ineffective-assistance claim. It is a claim of trial-court error. Thus, even if 
Martinez’s limited exception could apply in Utah state courts, it could not 
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apply to Kell’s non-trial-ineffective-assistance claim. The rule Kell wants—
excuse from defaults of non-trial-ineffectiveness claims on a showing of PCI 
counsel ineffectiveness—is not the Martinez rule at all. It is Martinez 
metastasized.  
 Second, Martinez’s narrow exception to the procedural default in 
federal habeas has no application in Utah’s state post-conviction regime. 
Creating an equitable rule like Martinez’s under Utah post-conviction law 
would not have any operative effect because Utah post-conviction 
proceedings are not “initial review collateral proceedings” as Martinez 
defined that term: “collateral proceedings which provide the first occasion to 
raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Martinez, 566 U.S. at 8. Utah 
law permits convicted persons to raise trial ineffective assistance claims on 
appeal. See, e.g., State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92 (Utah 2000); Utah 
R. App. P. 23B (effective October 1, 1992) (adopting a procedure for a remand 
to develop additional facts on an appellate challenge to trial counsel’s 
representation). The prohibition from raising trial counsel’s ineffectiveness 
on direct appeal that Martinez requires for its new “cause” exception to apply 
does not exist under Utah law. Banks v. Workman, 692 F.3d 1133, 1148 (10th 
Cir. 2012) (Martinez did not apply to excuse defaulted claims “because 
Oklahoma law permitted Mr. Banks to assert his claim of ineffective 
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assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal”). In fact, challenging trial 
counsel’s effectiveness on direct appeal has become ubiquitous in Utah.  
 Thus, the Martinez exception does not apply in Utah even under federal 
law because defendants may challenge their trial attorney’s effectiveness on 
appeal. Indeed, on direct appeal of a criminal case in which a defendant is 
entitled to the assistance of counsel, Utah law authorizes “the court to remand 
the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the 
appellate court’s determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.” Utah R. App. P. 23B(a). Kell has offered no reason to import into 
Utah law an inapplicable federal habeas doctrine that does no work here 
because the procedural defects it remedies do not exist in Utah in the first 
place. 
 As an alternative exception, Kell suggests the Court could limit 
Winward’s availability to capital cases, since “death is different.” Br.Aplt. 30 
(citation omitted). He says the Court could add another threshold inquiry for 
capital cases, whether “a clear constitutional violation” will go unaddressed 
by any court “absent application of the egregious injustice exception.” Id.  
 Kell is right, of course. Death cases are different: in all the universe of 
civil litigation, death-sentenced inmates are the only plaintiffs with a baked-
in incentive to prolong litigation and avert final judgment. Rhines, 544 U.S. 
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277–78. Non-death-sentenced petitioners do not typically need a broad rule 
exempting them from procedural bars because the incentives in those cases 
naturally push petitioners to seek relief as soon as possible. Kell’s argument 
here at least has the virtue of transparently acknowledging the true nature of 
what he is asking for: immunity for condemned prisoners to bring claims 
whenever they want without regard to their diligence or timeliness, so long 
as merits review can delay conclusion of their cases. A simple solution to be 
sure, but not a fair one. 
 And nothing in the common law and constitutional traditions leading 
up to Winward suggests any principled reason to exempt non-capital cases 
from the reach of whatever inherent constitutional habeas powers the Court 
retains. And Kell cannot seriously complain that no Court can reach the 
merits of his claim since it was his own tactical decisions, not some unfair 
procedural trap, that removed the claim from any court’s power to address 
it.  
c. Kell has inadequately briefed his constitutional 
challenge to the PCRA, and a ruling on that basis 
would be merely advisory because it would not 
entitle Kell to relief in any event.  
 Kell next argues, in a scant three pages of briefing, that if the PCRA 
procedural bars prevent merits review of his claim then the PCRA is 
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unconstitutional and the Court should revert to its “traditional common law 
authority over collateral proceedings.” Br.Aplt. 33.  
 Kell’s constitutional argument is inadequately briefed and thus fails his 
“burden of persuasion on appeal.” Salt Lake City v. Kidd, 2019 UT 4,¶20, 435 
P.3d 248. “[A]ll statutes are presumed to be constitutional and the party 
challenging a statute bears the burden of proving its invalidity.” State v. 
Angilau, 2011 UT 3,¶7, 245 P.3d 745 (citation omitted). An “issue is 
inadequately briefed if the argument merely contains bald citations to 
authority without development of that authority and reasoned analysis based 
on that authority.” Bank of America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2,¶11, 391 P.3d 196 
(cleaned up). 
 It is doubtful that in three short pages an appellant could adequately 
demonstrate the following sweeping propositions: (1) that the writ of habeas 
corpus, which the Utah Constitution entrusts to the judiciary, embraces 
collateral challenges to criminal judgments entered by courts of competent 
jurisdiction; (2) that the Legislature therefore either has no power to regulate 
the availability of the writ or, having some power to do so, exceeded that 
reasonable-regulation authority by enacting a flexible one-year statute of 
limitations and a procedural bar; and (3) the Legislature’s overreach obliges 
this Court to revert to the common law framework (4) despite this Court’s 
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rulemaking declaration that it would exercise whatever constitutional 
authority it has through the PCRA. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C. Kell’s brief makes 
gestures toward some of these ideas, but no more than a suggestion of an 
argument. 
As an example of Kell’s inadequate briefing, he says that this Court has 
“previously held that such restrictions on the Great Writ are impermissible.” 
Br.Aplt. 34 (emphasis added). In support, he relies on dicta from Julian v. 
State, a twenty-year-old post-conviction case, to argue that the current 
version of the PCRA is constitutionally infirm. 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998)). But 
Julian’s dicta has since been repudiated, and this Court has never held that 
application of the PCRA’s procedural bars or its current one-year statute of 
limitations is unconstitutional. In Julian, this Court ruled that an “inflexible” 
four-year statute of limitations applicable to civil claims not otherwise 
provided for by law could not be constitutionally applied to bar a post-
conviction petition. 966 P.2d at 252-53. But the Court did not hold that the 
PCRA’s one-year limitations period was unconstitutional. Indeed, Julian had 
not put the statute’s constitutionality directly at issue. See id. at 254. 
Nevertheless, this Court stated that “if the proper showing is made, the mere 
passage of time can never justify continued imprisonment of one who has 
been deprived of fundamental rights.” Id. at 254. The Court added, “[i]t 
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necessarily follows that no statute of limitations may be constitutionally 
applied to bar a habeas petition.” Id.  
That additional language did not control the outcome of Julian’s case 
because he had not directly challenged the constitutionality of the PCRA’s 
one-year limitations period; instead, he had argued only that a then-available 
“interests of justice” exception excused his untimely filing. Id.; see Swart v. 
State, 1999 UT App 96, ¶¶3-4, 976 P.2d 100 (per curiam) (acknowledging that 
Julian’s statements about the constitutionality of statutes of limitations to 
restrict habeas petitions were “dicta” and that “no court ha[d] yet actually 
declared the [PCRA’s] statute of limitations…unconstitutional”).  
Kell’s reliance on outdated and repudiated dicta does not amount to 
the kind of thoroughgoing briefing this Court requires to support novel 
constitutional propositions. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. University of Utah, 2018 UT 
1,¶19, 417 P.3d 78 (lamenting the parties’ “superficial” briefing, where the 
constitutional question “calls out for careful analysis of the precise terms of 
the Utah Constitution and its original meaning to aid in our determination of 
whether the ‘framers intended the provision to have’” a particular effect); Am. 
Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40,¶¶10-12, 140 P.3d 1235 (describing 
extensive sources a party should draw from in construing the Utah 
Constitution, such as “a review of the constitutional text,” “historical 
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evidence of the framers’ [and the citizens’] intent,” “our state’s particular 
traditions,” and “court decisions made contemporaneously to the framing of 
Utah’s constitution in sister states”) (ellipses omitted).  
But more ruinously to his argument, Kell has failed to demonstrate he 
would be entitled to relief under the common law were it even available to 
him. Under this Court’s pre-PCRA precedents, successive post-conviction 
petitions were procedurally barred. Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1036-37 
(Utah 1989). That common law bar gave way if the petitioner could show 
“good cause” under one of several enumerated exceptions. Id. at 1037. But 
before a court could examine a claim under one of the good cause exceptions, 
a petitioner had the burden of proving that a claim was not “withheld for 
tactical reasons.” Id.; see also Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d 315, 320 (Utah 1992). 
Likewise, claims of error that “should have been known” to the petitioner 
during previous phases of review could not support habeas relief under the 
common law. Lopez v. Shulsen, 716 P.2d 787, 788 (Utah 1986). 
 Kell has never attempted to meet his burdens under the common law 
to show that he did not withhold his claim for tactical reasons or that 
reasonable diligence would not have led him to raise the claim in his PCI 
proceedings. “His opening brief made no mention of the threshold burden 
under Hurst—of establishing that the claims were not withheld for tactical 
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reasons.” Pinder, 2015 UT 56,¶58 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). “That alone is a fatal misstep….” Id. And even if that were not fatal, 
his tactical withholding of the claim surely would be.  
 Kell failed to meet his burden to show he could get past the common 
law procedural bar even assuming the Court found the PCRA 
unconstitutional. Any ruling on the PCRA’s constitutionality would therefore 
be advisory, and under principles of constitutional avoidance this Court 
should refrain from ruling on it. See, e.g., State v. Anh Tuam Pham, 416 P.3d 
1122 (Utah 2018) (order dismissing certiorari) (denying certiorari in part on 
“principles of constitutional avoidance” since even assuming a 
“Confrontation Clause violation, any error…would have been harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt”).  
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the State asks the Court to affirm the lower 
court’s summary judgment. 
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Utah Code Annotated § 78B-9-101. Title 
 
This chapter is known as the “Post-Conviction Remedies Act.” 
 
 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-9-102. Replacement of prior remedies 
(1) (a) This chapter establishes the sole remedy for any person who challenges a 
conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other 
legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as provided in Subsection (2). 
This chapter replaces all prior remedies for review, including extraordinary or 
common law writs. Proceedings under this chapter are civil and are governed 
by the rules of civil procedure. Procedural provisions for filing and 
commencement of a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
(b) A court may not enter an order to withdraw, modify, vacate or otherwise 
set aside a plea unless it is in conformity with this chapter or Section 77-13-6. 
 
(2) This chapter does not apply to: 
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence for a 
criminal offense; 
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure; or 
 (c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
 
 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-9-103. Applicability--Effect on petitions 
 
Except for the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107, this chapter 




Utah Code Annotated § 78B-9-104. Grounds for relief--Retroactivity of rule 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78B-9-106 or 78B-9-107, a person who has been 
convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district 
court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the 
conviction or sentence upon the following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of 
the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed under a statute 
that is in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or 
the conduct for which the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally 
protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed or probation was revoked in violation of the 
controlling statutory provisions; 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate 
the conviction or sentence, because: 
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at 
the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any 
previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the 
evidence could not have been discovered through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was 
known; 
  (iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material 
evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found 
the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received; or 
(f) the petitioner can prove entitlement to relief under a rule announced by the 
United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, or the Utah Court of 
Appeals after conviction and sentence became final on direct appeal, and that: 
(i) the rule was dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's 
conviction or sentence became final; or 
(ii) the rule decriminalizes the conduct that comprises the elements of the 
crime for which the petitioner was convicted; or 
(g) the petitioner committed any of the following offenses while subject to 
force, fraud, or coercion, as defined in Section 76-5-308: 
  (i) Section 58-37-8, possession of a controlled substance; 
  (ii) Section 76-10-1304, aiding prostitution; 
  (iii) Section 76-6-206, criminal trespass; 
  (iv) Section 76-6-413, theft; 
  (v) Section 76-6-502, possession of forged writing or device for writing; 
  (vi) Sections 76-6-602 through 76-6-608, retail theft; 
(vii) Subsection 76-6-1105(2)(a)(i)(A), unlawful possession of another's 
identification document; 
  (viii) Section 76-9-702, lewdness; 
  (ix) Section 76-10-1302, prostitution; or 
  (x) Section 76-10-1313, sexual solicitation. 
 
(2) The court may not grant relief from a conviction or sentence unless the 
petitioner establishes that there would be a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome in light of the facts proved in the post-conviction proceeding, 
viewed with the evidence and facts introduced at trial or during sentencing. 
 
(3) The court may not grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the 
petitioner is innocent of the crime for which convicted except as provided in Title 
78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or Part 4, Postconviction 
Determination of Factual Innocence.Claims under Part 3, Postconviction Testing 
of DNA or Part 4, Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence of this 
chapter may not be filed as part of a petition under this part, but shall be filed 
separately and in conformity with the provisions of Part 3, Postconviction 
Testing of DNA or Part 4, Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence. 
 
 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-9-105. Burden of proof 
(1) (a) Except for claims raised under Subsection 78B-9-104(1)(g), the petitioner 
has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. 
(b) For claims raised under Subsection 78B-9-104(1)(g), the petitioner has the 
burden of pleading and proving by clear and convincing evidence the facts 
necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. 
(c) The court may not grant relief without determining that the petitioner is 
entitled to relief under the provisions of this chapter and in light of the entire 
record, including the record from the criminal case under review. 
 
(2) The respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion 
under Section 78B-9-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the 
burden to disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-9-106. Preclusion of relief--Exception 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
 (a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
 (b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
 (c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief 
or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-
conviction relief; or 
 (e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107. 
 
(2) (a) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time, 
including during the state's appeal from an order granting post-conviction 
relief, unless the court determines that the state should have raised the time 
bar or procedural bar at an earlier time. 
(b) Any court may raise a procedural bar or time bar on its own motion, 
provided that it gives the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
 
(3) (a) Notwithstanding Subsection (1)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a 
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, 
if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel; 
or 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsections (1)(c) and (1)(d), a person may be eligible for 
relief on a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial, 
on appeal, or in a previous request for post-conviction relief, if the failure to 
raise that ground was due to force, fraud, or coercion as defined in Section 76-
5-308. 
 
(4) This section authorizes a merits review only to the extent required to address 
the exception set forth in Subsection (3). 
 
 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-9-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction 
relief 
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year 
after the cause of action has accrued. 
 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the 
following dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of 
conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over 
the case, if an appeal is taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme 
Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari 
is filed; 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of 
the decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of 
certiorari is filed; 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise 
of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based; or 
(f) the date on which the new rule described in Subsection 78B-9-104(1)(f) is 
established. 
 
(3) The limitations period is tolled for any period during which the petitioner 
was prevented from filing a petition due to state action in violation of the United 
States Constitution, due to physical or mental incapacity, or for claims arising 
under Subsection 78B-9-104(1)(g), due to force, fraud, or coercion as defined 
in Section 76-5-308. The petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the petitioner is entitled to relief under this Subsection (3). 
 
(4) The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of the outcome of a 
petition asserting: 
 (a) exoneration through DNA testing under Section 78B-9-303; or 
 (b) factual innocence under Section 78B-9-401. 
 
(5) Sections 77-19-8, 78B-2-104, and 78B-2-111 do not extend the limitations 
period established in this section. 
 
 
§ 78B-9-108. Effect of granting relief--Notice 
(1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief, except requests for relief 
under Subsection 78B-9-104(1)(g), it shall either: 
 (a) modify the original conviction or sentence; or 
(b) vacate the original conviction or sentence and order a new trial or 
sentencing proceeding as appropriate. 
 
(2) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief under Subsection 78B-9-
104(1)(g), the court shall: 
 (a) vacate the original conviction and sentence; and 
 (b) order the petitioner's records expunged pursuant to Section 77-40-108.5. 
 
(3) (a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence, the order shall be stayed for 
five days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to 
the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial or 
sentencing proceedings, appeal the order, or take no action. 
(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice at any time during 
the stay period that it intends to take no action, the court shall lift the stay and 
deliver the order to the custodian of the petitioner. 
(c) If the respondent gives notice of intent to appeal the court's decision, the 
stay provided for by Subsection (3)(a) shall remain in effect until the appeal 
concludes, including any petitions for rehearing or for discretionary review 
by a higher court. The court may lift the stay if the petitioner can make the 
showing required for a certificate of probable cause under Section 77-20-
10 and URCP 27. 
(d) If the respondent gives notice that it intends to retry or resentence the 
petitioner, the trial court may order any supplementary orders as to 
arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that 
may be necessary. 
 
 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-9-109. Appointment of pro bono counsel 
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon 
the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis to 
represent the petitioner in the post-conviction court or on post-conviction appeal. 
Counsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not 
be appointed to represent the petitioner under this section. 
 
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the 
following factors: 
(a) whether the petition or the appeal contains factual allegations that will 
require an evidentiary hearing; and 
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require 
the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication. 
 
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective 
cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent post-conviction petition. 
 
 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-9-110. Appeal--Jurisdiction 
Any party may appeal from the trial court's final judgment on a petition for post-
conviction relief to the appellate court having jurisdiction pursuant to Section 
78A-3-102 or 78A-4-103. 
 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-9-201. Post-conviction remedies--30 days 
A post-conviction remedy may not be applied for or entertained by any court 
within 30 days prior to the date set for execution of a capital sentence, unless the 
grounds for application are based on facts or circumstances which developed or 
first became known within that period of time. 
 
 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-9-202. Appointment and payment of counsel in 
death penalty cases 
 
(1) A person who has been sentenced to death and whose conviction and 
sentence has been affirmed on appeal shall be advised in open court, on the 
record, in a hearing scheduled no less than 30 days prior to the signing of the 
death warrant, of the provisions of this chapter allowing challenges to the 
conviction and death sentence and the appointment of counsel for indigent 
petitioners. 
 
(2) (a) If a petitioner requests the court to appoint counsel, the court shall 
determine whether the petitioner is indigent and make findings on the record 
regarding the petitioner's indigency. If the court finds that the petitioner is 
indigent, it shall, subject to the provisions of Subsection (5), promptly appoint 
counsel who is qualified to represent petitioners in postconviction death 
penalty cases as required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Counsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may 
not be appointed to represent the petitioner under this section. 
(b) A petitioner who wishes to reject the offer of counsel shall be advised on 
the record by the court of the consequences of the rejection before the court 
may accept the rejection. 
 
(3) Attorney fees and litigation expenses incurred in providing the representation 
provided for in this section and that the court has determined are reasonable 
shall be paid from state funds by the Division of Finance according to rules 
established pursuant to Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking 
Act. 
(a) In determining whether the requested funds are reasonable, the court 
should consider: 
(i) the extent to which the petitioner requests funds to investigate and develop 
evidence and legal arguments that duplicate the evidence presented and 
arguments raised in the criminal proceeding; and 
(ii) whether the petitioner has established that the requested funds are necessary 
to develop evidence and legal arguments that are reasonably likely to support 
postconviction relief. 
(b) The court may authorize payment of attorney fees at a rate of $125 per hour 
up to a maximum of $60,000. The court may exceed the maximum only upon a 
showing of good cause as established in Subsections (3)(e) and (f). 
(c) The court may authorize litigation expenses up to a maximum of $20,000. The 
court may exceed the maximum only upon a showing of good cause as 
established in Subsections (3)(e) and (f). 
(d) The court may authorize the petitioner to apply ex parte for the funds 
permitted in Subsections (3)(b) and (c) upon a motion to proceed ex parte and if 
the petitioner establishes the need for confidentiality. The motion to proceed ex 
parte must be served on counsel representing the state, and the court may not 
grant the motion without giving the state an opportunity to respond. 
(e) In determining whether good cause exists to exceed the maximum sums 
established in Subsections (3)(b) and (c), the court shall consider: 
(i) the extent to which the work done to date and the further work identified by 
the petitioner duplicates work and investigation performed during the criminal 
case under review; and 
(ii) whether the petitioner has established that the work done to date and the 
further work identified is reasonably likely to develop evidence or legal 
arguments that will support postconviction relief. 
(f) The court may permit payment in excess of the maximum amounts 
established in Subsections (3)(b) and (c) only on the petitioner's motion, provided 
that: 
(i) if the court has granted a motion to file ex parte applications under Subsection 
(3)(d), the petitioner shall serve the motion to exceed the maximum amounts on 
an assistant attorney general employed in a division other than the one in which 
the attorney is employed who represents the state in the postconviction case; if 
the court has not granted a motion to file ex parte applications, then the 
petitioner must serve the attorney representing the state in the postconviction 
matter with the motion to exceed the maximum funds; 
(ii) if the motion proceeds under Subsection (3)(f)(i), the designated assistant 
attorney general may not disclose to the attorney representing the state in the 
postconviction matter any material the petitioner provides in support of the 
motion except upon a determination by the court that the material is not 
protected by or that the petitioner has waived the attorney client privilege or 
work product doctrine; and 
(iii) the court gives the state an opportunity to respond to the request for funds in 
excess of the maximum amounts provided in Subsections (3)(b) and (c). 
(4) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as creating the right to the effective 
assistance of postconviction counsel, and relief may not be granted on any claim 
that postconviction counsel was ineffective. 
(5) If within 60 days of the request for counsel the court cannot find counsel 
willing to accept the appointment, the court shall notify the petitioner and the 
state's counsel in writing. In that event, the petitioner may elect to proceed pro se 
by serving written notice of that election on the court and state's counsel within 
30 days of the court's notice that no counsel could be found. If within 30 days of 
its notice to the petitioner the court receives no notice that the petitioner elects to 
proceed pro se, the court shall dismiss any pending postconviction actions and 
vacate any execution stays, and the state may initiate proceedings under Section 
77-19-9 to issue an execution warrant. 
(6) Subject to Subsection (2)(a) the court shall appoint counsel to represent the 
petitioner for the first petition filed after the direct appeal. For all other petitions, 
counsel may not be appointed at public expense for a petitioner, except to raise 
claims: 
(a) based on newly discovered evidence as defined in Subsection 78B-9-
104(1)(e)(i); or 
(b) based on Subsection 78B-9-104(1)(f) that could not have been raised in any 
previously filed post trial motion or postconviction proceeding. 
 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C. Post-Conviction Relief 
(a) Scope. This rule governs proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief 
filed under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter 9. 
The Act sets forth the manner and extent to which a person may challenge the 
legality of a criminal conviction and sentence after the conviction and sentence 
have been affirmed in a direct appeal under Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, or the time to file such an appeal has expired. 
 
(b) Procedural defenses and merits review. Except as provided in paragraph (h), 
if the court comments on the merits of a post-conviction claim, it shall first 
clearly and expressly determine whether that claim is independently precluded 
under Section 78B-9-106. 
 
(c) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a 
petition with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment of 
conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms provided by the 
court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is 
filed in the wrong county. The court may order a change of venue on motion of a 
party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses. 
 
(d) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the 
petitioner has in relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence. The petition 
shall state: 
(d)(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of 
incarceration; 
(d)(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and 
sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, 
together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the 
petitioner; 
(d)(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the 
petitioner's claim to relief; 
(d)(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment 
for violation of probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number 
and title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the 
results of the appeal; 
(d)(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated 
in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case 
number and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and 
the results of the prior proceeding; and 
(d)(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered 
evidence, the reasons why the evidence could not have been discovered in 
time for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous 
post-conviction petition. 
 
(e) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall 
attach to the petition: 
(e)(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the 
allegations; 
(e)(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court 
regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's case; 
(e)(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-
conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the 
conviction or sentence; and 
 (e)(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court. 
 
(f) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or 
citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a 
separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
 
(g) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and 
deliver it to the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced 
the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the normal course. 
 
(h) (1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge shall review the petition, 
and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a 
prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, 
the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either 
that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face. 
The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim 
shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal 
need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
(h)(2) A claim is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations 
contained in the pleadings and attachments, it appears that: 
(h)(2)(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of 
law; 
  (h)(2)(B) the claim has no arguable basis in fact; or 
(h)(2)(C) the claim challenges the sentence only and the sentence has 
expired prior to the filing of the petition. 
(h)(3) If a claim is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading 
error or failure to comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall 
return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 21 days. The court 
may grant one additional 21-day period to amend for good cause shown. 
(h)(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-
conviction petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death. 
 
(i) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all 
or part of the petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court shall 
designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk 
to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the 
respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the 
respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General. In all other 
cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner. 
 
(j) Appointment of pro bono counsel. If any portion of the petition is not 
summarily dismissed, the court may, upon the request of an indigent petitioner, 
appoint counsel on a pro bono basis to represent the petitioner in the post-
conviction court or on post-conviction appeal. In determining whether to appoint 
counsel the court shall consider whether the petition or the appeal contains 
factual allegations that will require an evidentiary hearing and whether the 
petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require the assistance of 
counsel for proper adjudication. 
 
(k) Answer or other response. Within 30 days after service of a copy of the 
petition upon the respondent, or within such other period of time as the court 
may allow, the respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of 
the petition that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other 
response upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus 
time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for 
summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. 
No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the 
court. 
 
(l) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the 
proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also 
order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay 
unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing 
conference, the court may: 
 (l)(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues; 
 (l)(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and 
(l)(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to 
be presented at the evidentiary hearing. 
 
(m) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the 
prehearing conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The 
prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video 
conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on 
dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the 
proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where 
the petitioner is confined. 
 
(n) Discovery; records. 
(n)(1) Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the court 
upon motion of a party and a determination that there is good cause to 
believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence that is 
likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. 
(n)(2) The court may order either the petitioner or the respondent to obtain 
any relevant transcript or court records. 
(n)(3) All records in the criminal case under review, including the records in 
an appeal of that conviction, are deemed part of the trial court record in the 
petition for post-conviction relief. A record from the criminal case retains the 
security classification that it had in the criminal case. 
 
(o) Orders; stay. 
(o)(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the 
petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be 
stayed for 7 days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written 
notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new 
trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter 
the stay of the order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
(o)(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action 
will be taken, the stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the 
custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner. 
(o)(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or 
resentenced, the trial court may enter any supplementary orders as to 
arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that 
may be necessary and proper. 
(p) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed 
under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is 
indigent, the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity 
that prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the 
Department of Corrections, Utah Code Title 78A, Chapter 2, Part 3 governs the 
manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the amount, if 
any, to charge for fees and costs. 
 
(q) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be 
appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah 
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